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Thomas	Reid	(1710–96)	was	a	believer	in	God	whose	philosophical	





Hume	 pursues	 his	 philosophical	 labours	 explicitly	 with	 the	
intention	 of	 establishing	 the	 nature	 and	 proper	 limits	 of	 human	
cognitive	 powers	 and	 so	 de-legitimizing	 what	 he	 mostly	 calls	
‘superstition’.	 Where	 that	 word	 is	 most	 used	 it	 is	 plain	 that	 the	

























What	 Reid	 published,	 even	 when	 he	 comments	 on	 the	 longer	
history	of	philosophical	work,	is	with	a	view	to	responding	to	Hume.	
So	we	need	to	remind	ourselves	about	Hume’s	reasonings.	In	his	first	

















	 –	 i.e.	 abstract	 arguments,	 ‘remote	 views	 of	 things’,	 notably	
considerations	of	a	profoundly	philosophical	sort.	The	conclusions	of	
such	reflection	do	not	have	such	an	impact	on	us	as	to	make	us	actually	









he	 seems	 to	 be	 trying	 to	find	 a	 third	way	between	 the	mind	of	 the	
ordinary	 person	 in	 the	 street	 with	 her	 everyday	 beliefs,	 concerns	
and	 pleasures,	 and	 that	 of	 the	 rigorous	 rather	 sceptical	 philosopher	
who	 has	 exposed	 clear	 error	 and	 groundlessness	 in	 all	 or	much	 of	
the	 ordinary	 person’s	 less	 reflective	 take	 on	 the	 world.	 He	 wishes	
to	 avoid	 mere	 mental	 oscillation	 according	 to	 circumstance	 or	 the	
mood	between	these	 two	(logically	 incompatible)	ways	of	 thinking,	
and	being.	Because	 it’s	 impossible	 to	 live	out	one’s	 life	 in	practice	
in	a	way	that	is	consistent	with	being	the	sceptical	philosopher	of	the	









science	 and	 all	 philosophy.	 For	 yet	 another,	 in	 our	 reading	 and	
experience	we	meet	disputes	about	morality,	 the	principles	of	good	























to	 truth,	and	what	does	not.	Whether	our	conclusions	 then	 leave	us	
calm	or	troubled	is	irrelevant	to	their	value	as	philosophy.
Recently,	in	the	sports	pages	of	The Times of	16th	November	2011,	
I	 read	an	allusion	 to	Hume’s	 angst.	Matthew	Syed	 is	writing	about	
sportspeople	who	have	been	troubled	people,	even	suicidal.	He	thinks	




it	 also,	 at	 times,	 has	 to	 be	 the	 least	 important	 thing.’	Hume,	
the	 great	British	 [sic]	 philosopher,	made	 the	 same	 point.	As	
a	thinker	he	reached	some	dark	conclusions	about	the	human	
condition,	but	(unlike,	say,	Beckett	or	Nietzsche)	never	allowed	
them	to	affect	his	daily	 life.	 Instead	he	forgot	about	 them.	‘I	
dine,	 I	play	a	game	of	backgammon	and	am	merry	with	my	










that	 to	 diversions	 because	 that	 is	 too	 unsettling	 or	 uncomfortable	
for	 us.	 If	 the	 mood	 of	 anxiety	 or	 despair	 is	 alone	 the	 problem,	 a	
psychological	 solution	 (distracting	 social	 life	 and	 good	 food)	 may	
serve.	Hume	is	no	doubt	sensible	to	leave	off	for	a	bit	from	reckoning	
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with	 these	conclusions	and	grappling	with	 them,	 leaving	off	so	 that	
he	doesn’t	become	too	despairing,	losing	his	wits	even.	But	what	if	
it	only	makes	defensible	sense	to	carry	on	our	ordinary,	as	it	seems	


















our	 subjective	 awarenesses;	 they	 exist	 insofar	 as	 we	 have	 them	 in	
consciousness.	And	it	is	these,	and	only	these	which	we	are	immediately	
aware	of.	Impressions	or	ideas,	then,	are	the	contents	of	our	conscious	

















scrutiny	 of	 them.	Thus,	 for	Hume,	 knowledge,	 like	 an	 edifice,	will	




Locke	 and	 Berkeley	 also	 thought	 this	 way,	 as	 remarked.	 One	






it	 somehow	what	 seems	 to	us	a	yellowish	patch	or	object.	We	may	
not	know	exactly	what	 to	call	 it:	gamboge,	ochre,	or	what.	But	we	













There’s	 our	 knowledge	 (as	 we	 suppose	 it	 to	 be)	 of	 a	 world	 of	
physical	objects	which	exist,	we	suppose,	quite	independently	of	our	
minds’	awareness	of	them:	tables	and	chairs,	apples	and	planets,	our	
own	 bodies,	 and	 so	 forth.	 These	 sorts	 of	 things	 constitute	 what	 in	
this	context	is	called	‘the	external	world’.	But,	now,	if	all	that	we’re	
directly	aware	of	are	ideas,	mind-dependent	mental	entities,	how	can	




































of	 how	 the	 world	 works.	 A	 great	 proportion	 of	 human	 effort	 to	
understand	 the	 world	 is	 devoted	 to	 our	 identifying	 the	 causes	 of	
things	or	events.	Science	of	one	sort	or	another	is	into	causes.	Hume	
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The	 intense	 view	 of	 these	 manifold	 contradictions	 and	
imperfections	 in	 human	 reason	 has	 so	 wrought	 upon	 me,	
and	heated	my	brain,	 that	 I	 am	ready	 to	 reject	all	belief	and	
reasoning,	and	can	look	upon	no	opinion	even	as	more	probable	
or	 likely	 than	 another.	 Where	 am	 I,	 or	 what?	 From	 what	
causes	do	I	derive	my	existence,	and	to	what	condition	shall	




deplorable	 condition	 imaginable,	 inviron’d	 with	 the	 deepest	
darkness,	and	utterly	depriv’d	of	the	use	of	every	member	and	
faculty.6
When	 he	 manages	 to	 put	 this	 mood	 of	 hopelessness	 behind,	 he	
returns,	 the	 wings	 of	 intellectual	 pretension	 clipped,	 to	 consider	








































Analogous	moves	 are	made	by	Hume	 to	 deal	with	 his	 range	of	
problems,	e.g.	over	belief	in	a	world	of	objects	external	to	our	minds	
and	 over	 belief	 in	 personal	 identity.	 The	 subjective	 quality	 of	 our	
experiences,	their	force	and	vivacity	(compared	with	mere	fantasizing	
or,	as	we	would	put	it,	 imagination)	will	serve	to	trigger	our	belief-
forming	 disposition	 so	 that	 we	 judge	 there	 to	 be	 physical	 objects	
affecting	us.	Again	the	contents	of	what	we	judge	to	be	our	mind	are	
held	together	in	what	we	are	aware	of	as	our	persisting	self	by	a	species	
of	 association	 of	 ideas.	 Hence,	 our	 beliefs	 in	 causal	 connections,	
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what	 causes	what	 (or	what	will	 be	 causes	what)	 only	 on	 the	 basis	






as	 a	 cause.	 The	 Humean	 critique	 of	 design	 arguments	 makes	 an	
analogous	point:	we	have	insufficient	relevant	experience,	of	worlds	
being	 caused,	 to	 have	 a	 properly	 founded	view	on	 the	matter;	 and,	







further	 back).	 Reid	 sees	 this	 starting	 point	 as	 inevitably	 leading	 to	
scepticism,	 first	 about	 the	 character,	 and	 even	 the	 existence,	 of	 the	

















it	becomes	having	a	 thing	 there	 in	 the	mind.	 ‘Having	something	 in	










level	with	 the	 coin	when	only	 the	 edge	 is	 visible,	 is	 a	 short,	 thick,	


















past	 events	which	we	 remember,	or	our	beliefs	 in	causal	 links	–	as	
well	as	the	several	other	sorts	of	belief-producing	disposition	whose	
dubiousness	in	Hume’s	eyes	gives	rise	to	scepticism	about	them	and	






the	 favoured,	 trusted	ways	 to	belief	and	 those	which	are	held	 to	be	
unreliable,	 standing	 in	 need	 of	 vindication,	 justly	 under	 suspicion.	
Consider	introspection:	I	can	easily	get	wrong	what	I	seem	to	be	aware	
of	 by	 inattention,	 perhaps	 by	 having	my	 expectations	 about	what	 I	
should	be	seeing	so	strongly	misdirected	by	what	I	have	been	told	that	




does	 not	 characterise	 and	 so	 does	 not	 mark	 off	 introspection	 or	
intuition	 from	 our	 other	 belief-forming	 mechanisms	 as	 distinctly	
wholly	reliable.
Reid’s	contention,	then,	is	that	as	we	humans	are	constituted	we	
find	 ourselves	 with	 belief-forming	 dispositions.	 None	 of	 these	 is	
infallible;	but	there	is	a	presumption	in	their	favour	such	that	unless	
we	 have	 some	 reason	 to	 suspect	 that	 they	may	 have	misled	 us,	 or	












an	example,	 say	memory.	 If	we	wish	 to	establish	 the	credentials	of	
the	 memory-belief-forming	 disposition,	 how	 can	 we	 check	 out	 its	
reliability?	We	can	only	check	out	the	correctness	of	some	memory	by	
appealing	to	other	memories.	If	we	wonder	whether	we	misbehaved	
at	Avril’s	 birthday	 party	 at	 Crieff	 we	 might	 check	 a	 diary	 or	 ask	
someone	who	was	there.	But	we	have	to	remember	that	we	wrote	a	
diary	entry,	 that	 this	 is	our	diary,	 that	someone	else	was	 there	 then,	
and	that	their	memory	is	trustworthy.	The	same	sort	of	circularity	is	
inevitable	whenever	we	might	try	to	check	the	trustworthiness	of	our	






Corresponding	 to	 these	 modes	 of	 belief-formation	 are	 what	
Reid	calls	‘Principles’.	Variously,	these	are	the	‘Principles	taken	for	
granted’,	 ‘First	 Principles’,	 or	 ‘Principles	 of	 Common	 Sense’,	 and	
they	each	register	 trust	 in	one	of	our	belief-forming	practices.	They	
are	 Principles	 descriptive	 of	 our	 cognitive	 constitution.	 They	 have	
three	marks:






Principles	 of	 this	 sort	 speak	 of:	 our	 capacity	 to	 perceive	 objects	 in	
an	independently	(of	our	minds)	existing	world;	of	our	remembering	




Several	 modern	 Christian	 apologists	 have	 taken	 up	 Reid’s	
treatment	of	our	human	situation	in	matters	cognitive,	and	have	made	
use	 of	 his	 conception	 of	 distinct	 belief-forming	 dispositions	whose	
reliability	cannot	be	non-circularly	assessed	or	established.
William	 Alston’s	 book	 on	 ordinary	 sense	 perception8	 offers	
a	 Reidian	 case	 in	 that	 field,	 while	 his	 much	 fuller	 Perceiving 
God 9 maintains	that	we	have	(i.e.	have	been	given)	a	belief-forming	
disposition	 by	 which	 in	 appropriate	 circumstances	 we	 perceive	
(though	 not	with	 our	 eyes,	 particularly)	 God.	Alvin	 Plantinga	 and,	
perhaps	most	congenially	 to	Presbyterians,	Nicholas	Wolterstorff	of	
Yale,	 in	Divine Discourse10	 (where	 the	 imagery	of	God	who	speaks	
is	 central)	 have	 been	 advancing,	 with	 grateful	 acknowledgement	
to	 him,	 such	 Reid-inspired	 approaches	 to	 knowledge	 of	 God.
Alston	 maintains	 that	 a	 propensity	 to	 form	 beliefs	 about	 God,	







On	 the	 major	 topic	 of	 causation,	 Reid	 has	 important	 things	 to	
say	 which	 take	 their	 point	 of	 departure	 from	 Hume’s	 discussion	
of	 causation.	They	are	not	 (in	 the	way	of	much	of	what	he	 says)	 a	
countering	or	even	a	ridiculing	of	Hume.	With	regard	to	ridicule,	Reid	
had	said	 that	someone	who	really	does	believe	as	 the	philosophical	
sceptic	prescribes	 (i.e.	 that	maybe	 there	are	no	physical	objects,	no	
past,	no	sentient	me,	or	you)	is	actually	mad.	The	philosophical	sceptic	
himself	only	pretends	to	think	that	he	can	know	as	little	as	he	says	he	




Reid	says	 that	we	acquire	 the	concept	of	one	 thing’s	having	 the	
power	 to	 affect	 another	 from	our	 experience	of	our	 exerting	power	
when	by	our	volition	and	deliberate	agency	we	bring	some	specific	












about	 by	 the	 exertion	 of	 our	will.	That	 is	where	 our	 conception	 of	
power	comes	from,	where	it	can	only	come	from.
Now,	most	 changes	 in	 the	 world	 are	 not	 brought	 about	 by	 our	
exerting	our	will.	We	have	to	attribute	most	of	the	power	which	effects	
physical	 change	 in	 the	 world	 to	 God.	 Causal	 connections	 require	







by	 Reid	 as	 one	 calling	 for	 humility,	 gratitude	 and	 trust.	 Humility	
because	we	know	so	 little	 about	how	our	mind	gains	 its	 awareness	
of	 the	world	 of	 objects:	 the	 objects	 themselves	 do	 not	 act	 upon	 us	
(lacking	power	as	they	do).	That	ignorance	is	a	particular	sort	of	case	






Applying	 the	 above	 to	 belief	 formation:	 we	 do	 not	 understand	
in	any	deeper	ways	than	noting	recurring	patterns	why	in	particular	






introspection	and	 intuition.	But	 these	 (foundationalist)	philosophers	
cannot	 justify	 their	 believing	 in	 any	 such	 way.	 They	 must	 trust,	
like	 everyone	 else.	 Gratitude	 is	 called	 for	 because	 our	 belief-










Still,	 doesn’t	what	we’ve	 just	 seen	 about	 the	 appropriateness	of	
the	Judaeo-Christian	teaching,	which	otherwise	commends	humility,	
gratitude	 and	 trust,	 to	 what	 we	 have	 discovered	 of	 our	 epistemic	
situation	–	doesn’t	 this	 constitute	a	modest	measure	of	 support	 and	
maybe	confirmation	for	Judaeo-Christianity?	What	I	have	in	mind	is	
this:	Judaeo-Christianity	strongly	commends	humility,	gratitude	and	




















that	 Hume	 thought	 that	 there	may	well	 be	 a	 connection,	 but	 quite	
unknown	to	us,	between	a	cause	and	its	effect.)
Reid	apparently	says	 that	 there	 is	 surely	more	 than	expectation-
creating	 recurrence	 in	 causation:	 power	 to	 secure	 the	 effect	 is	
employed.	And	the	only	power	of	which	we	have	acquired	a	relevant	
concept	 is	 the	power	of	 an	agent;	 and	a	god	 is	 the	only	agent	who	
could	have	the	required	power	or	powers	in	causal	process.	Perhaps,	
cautiously,	Reid	may	be	ready	to	say	only	that	while	power	at	work	
in	 causal	 transactions	 remains	 a	 mystery,	 God	 would	 constitute	 a	
possible	explanation.	There	could	be	a	debate	over	whether	appealing	
to	 a	god’s	power	as	offering	a	possible	 explanation	of	what	 cannot	




Reid	did	believe	 in	a	causal	argument	 for	 the	existence	of	God,	








godmothers	 turning	 mice	 into	 horses,	 after	 all.	We	 do	 not	 believe	
that	 there	 are	 or	 have	 been	 causeless	 events.	 If	 our	 belief-forming	
dispositions	 in	respect	of	causation	are	 to	be	 trusted	along	with	our	
belief-forming	powers	which	 conform	 to	 standards	 required	 for	 the	




























	 William	 P.	Alston,	 The Reliability of Sense Perception	 (Ithaca,	
N.Y.:	Cornell	University	Press,	1993).
9
	 William	P.	Alston,	Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious 
Experience	(Ithaca,	N.Y.:	Cornell	University	Press,	1991).
10
	 Nicholas	Wolterstorff,	Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections 
on the Claim That God Speaks	(Cambridge;	New	York:	Cambridge	
University	Press,	1995).
11
	 Robert	 M.	 Adams,	 The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in 
Philosophical Theology	 (New	 York:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	
1987),	218.
